Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) activities of large u.S. commercial banks have been growing rapidly in recent years. These activities represented 58% of total bank assets in 1984 and grew to 176% of total bank assets in 1988. Bank regulators are concerned that OBS activities increase bank risk, and proposed that some OBS activities be included in the calculation of a risk-based capital requirement. This paper investigates the impact of OBS activities on market measures of risk. specifically, this paper examines the risk-reducing diversification and risk-increasing effects of OBS activities by employing implied asset variances, in addition to, equity and systematic risks as proxies for market measures of bank risk. This research contends that asset variance is a better measure of risk for regulated banking industry. A Ronn-Verma (JF, 1986) option pricing methodology is employed to calculate implied asset variances. Systematic risk, equity risk and implied asset risk are regressed over various measures of OBS items and on balance measures of risk in a Pooled Cross-section and Time-series sample. The results indicate that OBS activities, in general, reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk. The explanatory powers of the models are improved significantly when implied asset variances, instead of equity variances, are used to proxy for total risk. Because regulators are concerned with total risk and probability of bank failure, the risk-reducing potential of OBS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of OBS activities will penalize large banks.
In recent years co~nercial banks have engaged In activities that do not appear on their balance sheets. These Off-balance sheet (henceforth ODS) activities are contingent claims or contracts that generate fee income for a bank. Hm.'ever, these ODS activities also create balance sheet or portfolio risk. A contingent claim involves an obligation to lend or provide funds should the contingency be realized. Therefore, it does not create a change in the balance sheet until the contingency is realized. While a loan is an asset on a bank's balance sheet, a promise to make a loan is a contingent liability which creates a potential funding obligation in the future. A bank also has limited 2 control over when its obligation to provide funds will be exercised. As a result of its off-balance sheet activity, a bank faces three general types of portfolio risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due to asset and liability mismatches on commitment takedmms and interest rate swaps, and liquidity risk due to the over-extension of obligations.
Because of financial and technological innovations in the 1970s and increased competition in the financial services industry, banks have unbundled their traditional banking services, in particular, separating funding of assets by deposit liabilities from other services. Depending on the specific bank customer, low value-added services (such as bearing interest rate risk) are ."
de-emphasized and high value-added services (such as underwriting the direct placement of debt) are emphasized without impairing the provision of services to other bank customers. This unbundling is the primary force behind the significant growth in off-balmlce sheet banking activities and fee income as a source of profitability, especially at large commercial banks.
Off-balance sheet activities have been gro,~ing rapidly in recent years. Section IV analyzes data and presents the empirical results. A summary of major conclusions and policy evaluation appears in Section V.
II. OFF-BALANCE ACTIVITIES AND BANK RISK-TAKING BEllAVIOR
A number of competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of OBS items have been proposed in literature. A bank's activity in the market for off-balance sheet credit enhancement is a function of its willingness to accommodate the needs of its customers, the market's perception of a bank's quality as reflected in balance sheet decisions and the incentives provided by the regulators. Theories of financial intermediation suggest that ODS banking activities are designed to provide credit enhancement services to its customers.
By guaranteeing funds availability, the intermediary has an incentive to efficiently monitor the borro,{ers, produce information and signal its credibility, and specialize in credit evaluation. ODS banking activities thus represent substitute methods for allocating credit with complementaries in production. The risk-return trade-off between selling information services and warehousing assets will induce a bank to divide its business between both balance and off-balance sheet finffilcial activities. Therefore, OBS activities do not affect fundamental business risk of banking firms. Because part of 'business risk is diversifiable, the remaining market risk is also unaffected by OBS activities. The diversification hypothesis implies that banks engage in OBS activities to diversify its asset portfolio in order to achieve within firm diversification and to avoid the wrath of disappointed bank shareholders [see Diamond (1984) , Pavel (1987 Pavel ( , 1988 J. This hypothesis suggests a negative relationship between total bank risk ffild ODS activities.
The Leverage Hypothesis states that fixed rate deposit insurance together with capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage through the issuance of ODS activities that are not subject to capital requirements. By increasing financial leverage in this ,{ay, a bank can enhance whatever subsidies it receives from deposit insurance. This hypothesis thus predicts a positive relationship between total bank risk and OBS activities [see Pyle (1985) , Benveniste and Berger (1986) ].
The empirical evidence of the risk-behavior of ODS banking activities is inconclusive. Lynge and Lee (1987) found that the coefficients of independent variables incorporating OBS banking activities are significantly negative in a model explaining total risk, but insignificant in a model explaining systematic risk. Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) found that SLCs reduce systematic risk but loan commitments and commercial letters of credit do not affect systematic risk. Pavel (1987) found that loan sales have little impact on b~k risk. Avery and Berger (1988) regressed three bank performance measures against OBS activities and found that SLCs are associated with poor bank performance but loan commitments are associated with better bank performance.
The empirical literature of OBS banking risk contains a number of limitations, which this research seeks to rectify. By measuring OBS banking risk in a more theoretically appealing way, bank regulators and investors can gain a better understanding of the size of the risks that are involved and policies that might make effective control possible.
First, this study distinguishes between risk-reducing diversification and risk-increasing hypotheses of ODS banking risk. This is important because the largely undiversified bank regulators are more concerned with total risk and probability of bank failures, and diversified investors are concerned with systematic risk. If risk-reducing diversification effect of OBS activities dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activvities, then the risk-adjusted capital requirement of ODS banking activities may be inappropriate.
The empirical research also ignored the impact of regulation on bank risk measurement. The equity risk used in previous studies ignores the fact that banking is a regulated industry. This research measures risk in such a way that incorporates the effect of deposit insurance and the regulatory closure rules.
A bank's total asset risk, rather than equity risk, explicitly captures the impact of deposit insurance because both bank debtholders and equityholders benefit from deposit insurance subsidies.
Second, the leverage and diversification effects of OBS banking risk is investigated by measuring asset risk of banks, which is based upon a risk-based deposit insurance premium developed by Ronn and Verma (1986) . A beta risk model IS also used to investigate whether equityholders take into account the effects of OBS banking activities. 
III. HYPOTllESES TESTING AND METllODOLOGY

llYPOTllESES TESTING
The first research question to be investigated is the relationship between OBS banking activities and market risk. ilecause theory suggests that OilS banking activities are not concern for \iell-diversified investors, the following hypothesis is tested to examine the market risk of OilS activities.
IIypothesis One:
OBS banking activities do not affect market risk.
Total risk can be decomposed into three parts:
Total risk = market risk + diversifiable risk + financial risk.
The diversification potential of DOS activities is expected to decrease diversifiable risk and the leverage potential of OBS activities is expected to increase financial risk. Because leverage potential of OBS activities is realized only when such guarantees are exercised, the following hypothesis is tested to examine the total risk of OBS activities.
IIypothesis Two:
The diversification effects of IBS activities outweigh leverage potentials, and result in a reduction of total risk.
MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
To test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, the follO\o/ing tlW accounting-based risk models are estimated over cross-section and time-series data using the generalized least squares (GLS) technique. The expected signs of partial derivatives appear on each independent variable. Similar off-balance sheet groupings are also done by Lynge and Lee (1988) .
These variables are reported in Table 2 . LEY, DIY, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE and POP are proxies for leverage ratio, diversification index, credit risk, interest rate risk, operating risk illld dividend payout ratio. This research exploits these previously tested accounting risk variables in order to examine the principal research questions of the risk-taking behavior of off-balance sheet banking activities. All these variables have been normalized by total assets in order to eliminate heteroskedasticity problem in the statistical estimation.
The negative sign of DIV variable indicates that diversification by bank loan portfolio reduces total risk. The positive sign of LEV variable indicates that leverage ratios of banks increase total risk. In addition, the negative signs of OBS variables in equation (2) implies that, after controlling for on-balance leverage and diversification effects, risk-reducing diversificatio~ effect of OBS activities dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activities.
Bank risk will be measured three different ways. The first measure of risk is the standard deviation of equity return (ROE). The second measure of risk is based upon a risk-based deposit insurance premium developed by Ronn and Verma (JF, 1986). The third measure of risk is systematic risk and is proxied by beta.
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The measure of asset risk used in this research is the risk-based deposit insurance premium estimated by Ronn and Verma (1986) . Ronn 
is the cumulative density of a standard normal random variable; U is the v standard deviation of the rate of return on BUC's assets; T is the time to expirat ion, i. e., the time unt il the next audit of the BIIC (assumed to be 1);
V is the value of the BIlC's assets adjusted for stock-splits and dividends; B is the value of the BllC's debt.
Two variables in the above equation are not empirically observable: V and u v . They can, however, be solved for by representing the equity of a bank holding company as a call option on the assets of the firm with the same maturity as debt and the striking price equal to the maturity value of the debt (Black and Scholes, 1973).
Ronn and Verma (1986) point out that the FDIC does not liquidate a bank as soon as it observes that its net worth is negative. Rather the FDIC tries to revive the bank. The FDIC is concerned about containing the disruptive effect of an individual bank failure to ensure that it never reaches the magnitude of a bank run. These concerns not only have the effect of allowing a bank to operate up to a certain point beyond complete erosion of net worth, but also are perceived by the market to have such an effect. They assume, however, that some hypothetical limit of erosion of value exists such that revival becomes too costly. This hypothetical limit can be expressed as a percentage of total debt of the bank. This also alters the boundary condition to be applied to the equity, construed as a call option. The closure rule is therefore modeled as follows: the FDIC liquidates a bank if V T < pO where V T is the terminal value of assets at time T and p < = 1 is a policy parameter. Given this modified closure rule and the standard options-theoretic relationship between the instantaneous variances of the derivative and underlying assets, the equity of the bank holding company can be written as:
where E is the market price of equity and ~E is the instantaneous standard deviation of the return on E. Here equity is a fully dividend-protected call because being the recipient of dividends, equity is in fact dividend-protected.
Equations (4) and (5) The maturity of debt (T) is assumed to be one year in empirical calculation of models (4) and (5) . The equity value refers to the maturity of debt while the deposit insurance refers to periodicity of audit by the insurer. In a regulatory environment, the rational investor would link the debt maturity to audit periodicity. These tHO maturities cannot be separated in the context of Table 3 .
CALCULATION OF MARKET MEASURES OF RISK
Equity risk is proxied by the standard deviat ion of equity return. SImIAE SlGMA2 is calculated in the same way as SIGMA1, except that the leverage ratio is augmented by OBS debt. The mean value of SIG~U2 is smaller than that of SIGMA1. This can be explained by the call feature of equity value. As the face value of debt is augmented by OBS items, the value of equity decreases at the closure date. Because the call value is directly related to asset variance, a 100.,rer asset variance is associated with a decreased call value. have the wrong signs, but they are not statistically significant. These results support the findings of Lynge and Lee (1987) that off-balance __ sheet items reduce total risk. Models using the total risk (SIGMAE) as the dependent variables have higher average R 2 compared to models using systematic risk (BETA) as the dependent variables (.18 versus .14). The fact that on-balance and off-balance measures of risk explain a larger portion of total risk than systematic risk is not surprising. Total risk includes both systematic risk and specific risk.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification potential of OBS items dominates the risk-increasing potential of OBS items can be tested by
Certain diversifiable accounting measures of risk such as credit risk (ALOSS)
are expected to affect mostly specific risk rather than systematic risk. level. Therefore, it appears that total off-balance sheet items (AOBS) variable is risk-increasing Hith this particular risk measure. insurance premium makes deposits equally risk-free across banks. This explicit pricing structure encourages moral hazard behavior because there is no explicit penalty in the form of higher insurance premiums for excess risk-taking. Under this scheme, high-risk banks are subsidized by low-risk banks. To discourage excessive risk-taking and to price its insurance contract more fairly, the FDIC uses regulatory interferences to extract implicit premiums from high-risk banks.
Usually, the regulators impose asset and capital regulation, by requiring banks to limit portfolio risk or calling for an infusion of capital.
Ronn-Verma (1986) point out that FDIC does not close a bank as soon as it observes that its net Iwrth is negat i ve. They argue that there is a hypothetical limit, expressed as a percentage of total debt, beyond which revival of a bank becomes too costly and closes the bank. Otherwise, the FDIC calls for an infusion of additional capital. The isomorphic relationship between equity as a call option, modified to build into it the market's perception of the implementation of closure rule, can be used to invert market prices of equity for asset values and variances. These asset variances incorporate the impact of deposit insurance and regulatory closure rules explicitly. Therefore, asset variances are better than equity variances In proxying total risk in the regulated banking industry.
A pooled cross-section and time-series model, instead of simple OL8, was employed to perform the econometric analysis for tlVO reasons. First, cross-section or time-series data alone (32 cross-sections and 5 time-periods)
are not sufficient to extract enough degrees of freedom in regression analysis.
Second, cross-sections and time-series relationships of OilS banking decisions are better captured by a pooled cross-section and time-series model.
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows.
First, test results support the hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification effects of OBS banking items dominate risk increasing effects of OilS banking items, thus reducing overall riskiness of banks. Second, the results also validate the hypothesis that ODS banking items do not affect systematic risk.
Only Standby Letters of Credit reduce systematic risk. Third, all seven off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing depending on proxy used for total risk. T\w off-balance sheet items (ADS, ACLC, and ASLC) are always risk-reducing regardless of the proxy used for total risk.
Fourth, the explanatory pm.'ers of the models are improved significantly \.'hen implied asset variances, instead of equity variances, are used to proxy for total risk. This is evidenced by significant increase in R 2 . These results provide credence to the argument that implied asset variances are better measures of total market risk for regulated banking industry. Fifth, several on-balance measures of accounting risk also shm.' statistically significant correlations with market measures of risk. Finally, pooled cross-section and time-series analysis of ODS banking risk provides better coefficient estimates (increased t-statistics) and increases the statistical significance of models (increased F-statistics).
The existing policy proposal to regulate ODS banking risk by bringing them into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical findings of this research. The results indicate that off-balance sheet activities, in general, reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk, implying that off-balance sheet risk is not a concern of well-diversified stockholders. '{hile bank regulators are concerned with total risk and the probability of bank failures, the risk reducing potential of OilS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of OBS banking activities will penalize large banks. n/a nla nla nla nla Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages nla nla nla nla nla Private residential mortgage loans nla n/a n/a n/a n/a DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a nla Farmer Mac agricultural mortgage loan pools DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold nla n/a n/a nla nla Amount of recourse exposure on these mortgages n/a nla nla nla nla riskiness, (2) some off-balance sheet items would also be weighted and added to risk-weighted assets, and (3) banks from 12 participating countries would, for the first time, be subject to a common minimum capital standard.
In these proposed guidelines, supplemental capital ratios are to be calculated that explicitly incluue stand.by and commercial letters of credit, and loan commitments. Loan commitments are in the money market risk category (weight = 30'7.), commercial letters of credit are in the moderate risk category (l.;eight = 607.), and standby letters of credit are in either the moderate risk category or the standard risk category (lieight = 1007.) depending on their reasons for issuance. The lieights determine the quantity of each item that is included in risk assets and then compared to primary capital.
